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Abstract 
In emissions trading, the initial allocation of permits is an intractable issue because 
it needs to be essentially fair to the participating countries. There are many ways to 
distribute a given total amount of emissions permits among countries, but the 
existing distribution methods, such as auctioning and grandfathering, have been 
debated. In this paper we describe a new method for allocating permits in emissions 
trading using the Boltzmann distribution. We introduce the Boltzmann distribution 
to permit allocation by combining it with concepts in emissions trading. We then 
demonstrate through empirical data analysis how emissions permits can be 
allocated in practice among participating countries. The new allocation method 
using the Boltzmann distribution describes the most probable, natural, and 
unbiased distribution of emissions permits among multiple countries. Simple and 
versatile, this new method holds potential for many economic and environmental 
applications. 
 
Keywords: Climate change, emissions trading, permit allocation, entropy maximization, 
fair distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
Scientists have warned that global warming of more than 1°C would constitute a 
dangerous climate change based on the likely effects on sea levels and the extermination 
of species [1]. Furthermore, climate change that occurs as a result of increases in CO2 
concentration is largely irreversible for 1,000 years, even after CO2 emissions cease [2]. 
According to the Stern Review, prompt, decisive action is clearly warranted, and, because 
climate change is a global problem, the response to it must be international [3]. 
 
Various ideas have been proposed for slowing global warming and reducing CO2 
emissions to the atmosphere, including reflecting solar radiation with small particles in 
the stratosphere, putting deflectors in space, growing trees and other biomass to remove 
CO2 from the atmosphere, fertilizing oceans with iron to remove CO2, and reducing CO2 
emissions through carbon taxes or emissions trading [4]. Among these, numerous studies 
found that emissions trading lowers the cost of reaching the commitments of the Kyoto 
Protocol [5]. 
 
The basic concepts of emissions trading were established in past decades [6-13]. As with 
any trading system, in the emissions trading system, the flow and value of what is traded 
depends on its initial allocation, its supply, and the demand for it [14]. There are many 
possible ways to distribute a given total of emissions permits among participants [15]; 
traditionally, grandfathering and auctioning have been suggested for initial permit 
allocation [16, 17].  
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Permit allocation is one of the most intractable issues to resolve in designing emissions 
trading systems. A permit-allocation rule should be simple, should be based in part on 
historical data, and should be perceived as fair [18]. Because the flow and value of 
emissions permits depends on their initial allocation, the fair allocation of a limited 
number of permits among countries or firms is not only important but also controversial. 
 
In this paper, we introduce an alternative method for initial permit allocation using the 
Boltzmann distribution. We first describe the basic concept of the Boltzmann distribution 
and then develop its mathematical formula for the allocation of emissions permits. Next, 
through empirical data analysis, we demonstrate how this allocation method can be used 
in practice for initial permit allocation. 
 
2. The Boltzmann distribution 
In the physical sciences, the Boltzmann distribution yields the equilibrium probability 
distribution of a physical system in its energy substates [19, 20]. The description is valid 
as long as each physical particle of the system is identical to but distinguishable from the 
others and as long as the interaction among the particles can be taken to be negligible. 
Based on the Boltzmann distribution, the probability (Pi) that a particle can be found in 
the ith substate is inversely proportional to the exponential function of the substate energy 
(Ei). A well-known example is the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution, which describes the 
velocity distribution of ideal gas molecules [19-21]. 
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The Boltzmann distribution is based on entropy maximization and has been employed in 
a number of fields. For example, some economists and physicists have introduced 
entropy concepts into the field of economics and have discussed the distribution of 
economic systems and their evolution [22-34]. Similarly, econophysicists have employed 
a stochastic process in describing the dynamics of individual wealth or income and in 
deriving their probability distributions [33, 35-38]. 
 
In this paper, entropy maximization is brought to international emissions trading via the 
Boltzmann distribution, which provides guidelines for allocating emissions permits 
among multiple countries. Here, the concept of a physical system is replaced by the 
concept of an emissions trading system that consists of all participating countries. The 
concept of the physical particle is replaced by that of the unit emissions permit. The 
concept of the physical substates is replaced by that of individuals of the participating 
countries. Assuming that all individuals in a country i contribute equally to the total CO2 
emissions of that country i, the potential energy Ei of a physical substate i is replaced by 
the “allocation potential energy per capita” (Ei) of the country i. With this replacement, 
the Ei becomes an intensive variable (as apposed to an extensive variable) for the country 
i [19]. Thus the probability that a unit emissions permit is allocated to a country i is 
proportional to its total population and is inversely proportional to the exponential 
function of the allocation potential energy per capita Ei. This allocation potential energy 
per capita may be given in complicated forms and can include various political and 
economic parameters. One simplest form can be given in a way such that it is negatively 
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proportional to the actual CO2 emissions per capita of a country i. Details on the 
probability distribution function are summarized in Table 1. Table 1 also includes a 
diagram of the permit allocation using the Boltzmann distribution. 
 
Table 1  
The Boltzmann distribution for permit allocation 
 
Boltzmann 
distribution Description 
In physical sciences 
iE
i eP
  
Where, 
Pi = probability that a particle stays in substate i 
e = constant of the exponential function ≈ 2.71828 
β = 1/kT (k = Boltzmann constant, T = absolute temperature) 
Ei = energy of substate i 
Potential application 
In permit allocation 
iE
ii eCP
  
Where, 
Pi = probability that emissions permits are allocated to a country i 
e = constant of the exponential function ≈ 2.71828 
β = constant (  0) 
Ei = allocation potential energy per capita of a country i 
Ci = total population of a country i 
Permit allocation 
using the Boltzmann 
distribution*  
 
 
* The total available emissions permits (αN) are split into N pieces of unit carbon credit α, and 
then the emissions permits are allocated to country i (i = 1, 2, and 3) based on the probability 
distribution (Pi) from the Boltzmann distribution. Note that the number (N) of unit emissions 
permits can always be made large enough for the Boltzmann statistics by making the unit 
emissions permit (α) smaller. 
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Note that the Boltzmann distribution in the physical sciences describes a physical system 
in thermodynamic equilibrium representing the maximum entropy at a given total internal 
energy. In other words, the Boltzmann distribution describes the most probable 
distribution of a physical system. However, the allocation of permits in emissions trading 
does not have to follow the maximum entropy principle. Indeed, existing allocation 
methods such as auctioning and grandfathering are unrelated to entropy maximization. 
What we are attempting to do here is to develop an allocation method that follows the 
maximum entropy principle using the Boltzmann distribution. In contrast to the existing 
allocation methods, the new allocation method based on the Boltzmann distribution 
provides a simple and natural rule for allocating emissions permits among multiple 
countries. 
 
3. The Boltzmann distribution for permit allocation 
Suppose that n countries are participating in the permit allocation for international 
emissions trading. Consider that the total available emissions permits (αN) are allocated 
to the countries and that a country i has the allocation potential energy per capita of Ei 
and a population Ci (where i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n; α is the unit emissions permit; and N is the 
total number of unit emissions permits). The number of unit emissions permits that are 
allocated to the jth individual in a country i is . jiN
 
We apply two constraints during the permit allocation (Eqs. (1) and (2)). 
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The first constraint implies that the total number of available unit emissions permits (N) 
is conserved, that is, that no emissions permits are being taken away or added during 
allocation. The second constraint corresponds to total energy conservation in the physical 
sciences. The value E (total global allocation energy) determines the overall distribution 
of the emissions permits over countries, and therefore, in practice, it needs to be 
determined based on the agreement among the participating countries. Once determined, 
it remains constant during the permit allocation. Note that the total allocation energy E is 
related to the ‘temperature’ of the system, and therefore to the β value in the Boltzmann 
distribution as described below. 
Given the two constraints, the most probable permit allocation following the maximum 
entropy principle is provided from the Boltzmann distribution, which follows the simple 
formula [20] 
 , (3) iEji AeN

where A is a constant and A can be found using the first constraint in Eq. (1). Note that 
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Rearranging, 
 8
 



 n
i
E
i
ieC
NA
1

. (5) 
Therefore, the probability that a unit emissions permit is allocated to a country i can be 
expressed in Eq. (6): 
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,   for i = 1, 2, ···, n. (6) 
Then the amount of emissions permits that are allocated to a country i is 
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 ,   for i = 1, 2, ···, n. (7) 
In a physical system, the β value in the Boltzmann distribution (Eqs. (3-7)) is defined as 
1/kT (where k is the Boltzmann constant and T is the temperature of the system). 
Temperature is directly related to the total energy of the system (the second restraint 
value (E) in Eq. (2)). Therefore, the β value is directly related to the overall distribution 
of the allocated permits and, therefore, it must be determined based on the agreement 
among the participating countries. In order to provide a guideline for determining the β 
value, we must first understand the influence of the β value on permit allocation, which is 
described below. 
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4. The β value in the Boltzmann distribution 
The next step is to develop a guideline for determining the β value in the Boltzmann 
distribution. It is assumed that the allocation potential energy per capita (Ei) of a country i 
is negatively proportional to the CO2 emissions per capita of a country i.   
 
With a β value in the positive regime (β > 0, which corresponds to the positive 
temperatures of a physical system), emissions permits tend to be allocated to the 
countries that have relatively lower allocation potential energy. In this situation, the 
country with the greatest CO2 emissions per capita (and, therefore, the highest demand 
for emissions permits) has the lowest allocation potential energy; therefore, it has the 
largest probability of receiving emissions permits. 
 
To see the effects of the β value in permit allocation, we first consider two extreme 
situations in which β values approach the limiting values 0 or ∞. If β approaches 0, then 
the Boltzmann probability in Eq. (6) involves only the populations of the participating 
countries ( 
n
i
iii CCP
1 ). In this case, all individuals in the participating countries receive 
an equal amount of emissions permits, and these are distributed in proportion to the total 
population of a country i. Note that this situation corresponds to one of the suggested 
fairness notions for the distribution of emissions permits, Egalitarian (in international 
climate policy, Egalitarian means that “all people have an equal right to pollute or to be 
protected from pollution”) [39, 40]. When β approaches 0, the countries with lower CO2 
emissions per capita (i.e., higher allocation potential energy per capita) and a large 
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population are most likely satisfied because they can meet their demand relatively easily. 
On the other hand, this situation is unfavorable to countries with greater CO2 emissions 
per capita (i.e., lower allocation potential energy per capita). Therefore, the countries 
with high CO2 emissions per capita will prefer increased β values. 
  
If β increases and approaches ∞, then the Boltzmann probability acquires non-zero values 
only for the few countries with the greatest CO2 emissions per capita (lowest allocation 
potential energy per capita), and becomes 0 for all other countries. In this situation the 
countries with the greatest CO2 emissions per capita share all the available emissions 
permits and therefore derive the greatest benefit. But all other countries are left 
unsatisfied because they obtain only a few permits. Therefore, the other countries will 
prefer relatively smaller β values. 
 
Based on the above situations, we can conclude that the countries with relatively low CO2 
emissions per capita and large populations prefer smaller β values, and that those with 
relatively high CO2 emissions per capita prefer larger β values. Therefore, agreement on a 
proper β value might not be easily reached, because no single value satisfies all countries. 
In practice, the β-value determination will involve a competition between the group of 
countries having relatively large populations and the group of countries having relatively 
high CO2 emissions per capita. 
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In this paper, we do not attempt to derive the single most suitable β value for permit 
allocation. Instead, we suggest a useful reference β value using the least square (y) 
calculation between the allocated permits and demand, as in Eq. (8). 
    (8) 


n
i
ii demandpermitsy
1
2)(
When the least square value (y) has its minimum at a β value, it can be considered a 
useful reference β value. 
 
5. Empirical Data Analysis 
To demonstrate permit allocation using the Boltzmann distribution, we selected eight 
countries. Table 2 shows the CO2 emissions for the eight countries in 2007 and 2008, the 
CO2 emissions per capita in 2008, and the total population in 2008, the latest years for 
which annual CO2 emissions data are available, when the following empirical data 
analysis was carried out. It is assumed that the global (in this case, 8-country) target of 
CO2 emissions in 2008 is a 3% reduction of the total CO2 emissions in 2007. Thus the 
total amount of allowed emissions permits for 2008 is 17,084,135 (1000 metric tons), 
which is then allocated to the eight countries (Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, the U.K., and the U.S.) using the Boltzmann distribution. 
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Table 2 
The carbon dioxide emissions in 2007 and 2008, total population in 2008, and 
carbon dioxide emissions per capita in 2008. 
 
2007 2008 
Country Emissions* 
(1000 metric tons) 
Emissions* 
(1000 metric tons) Population** 
Emissions per capita 
(metric tons) 
Canada 544,172 544,091 33,311,400 16.33
China 6,791,805 7,031,916 1,324,655,000 5.31
Germany 787,235 786,660 82,110,097 9.58
Italy 459,376 445,119 59,832,179 7.44
Japan 1,251,188 1,208,163 127,704,040 9.46
Russia 1,667,576 1,708,653 141,950,000 12.04
UK 529,621 522,856 61,393,521 8.52
US 5,581,537 5,461,014 304,375,000 17.94
Total 17,612,510*** 17,708,472 2,135,331,237 86.62
 
* Source: Millennium Development Goals Database in United Nations Statistics Division 
The most recent data (2008) are used in this paper.  
See http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=co2+emissions&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3a749 
** Source: World Development Indicators in the World Bank 
See 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=population+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aSP.POP.T
OTL 
*** 97 percent of 2007 emissions (17,084,135 (1000 metric tons)) was set to be the global target and the 
value of the total available emissions permits for 2008 in the empirical data analysis. 
 
In the following empirical data analysis, the allocation potential energy per capita (Ei) of 
a country i is defined as the negative value of CO2 emissions per capita of a country i in 
2008. Using this simple definition, the emissions permits are more likely to be allocated 
to the countries with greater CO2 emissions per capita. 
 
As described earlier, the permit allocation based on the Boltzmann distribution is largely 
affected by the β value in Eq. (6). Therefore, we first consider a reasonable range of β 
values for the permit allocation for each country. Fig. 1 shows the permit allocation using 
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the Boltzmann distribution as a function of the β value. From this data, the β-value range 
preferred by each country can be determined. As shown in Fig. 1, the U.S. meets its 
demand (CO2 emissions in 2008) at the β value of 0.0953. Therefore, the U.S. prefers 
values larger than 0.0953, and Canada prefers β values between 0.1063 and 0.7426. 
China prefers β values smaller than 0.0978, and Italy prefers β values smaller than 0.0507. 
But the four remaining countries (Germany, Japan, Russia, and the U.K.) cannot obtain 
sufficient emissions permits to meet their actual emissions. This is because the total 
allowed emissions permits in 2008 (97% of 2007 emissions) is less than the total CO2 
emissions in 2008. Note that, as shown in Fig. 1, the permit allocation is driven mainly by 
the competition between two countries: China, which produces the greatest CO2 
emissions overall (but has the smallest CO2 emissions per capita due to its large 
population), and the U.S., which has the greatest CO2 emissions per capita. 
 
This observation revisits a challenging question in the reduction of CO2 emissions. 
Which country should be most responsible for future reduction: the one that produces the 
greatest CO2 emissions overall (China), or the one that produces the greatest CO2 
emissions per capita (the U.S.)? In the permit allocation using the Boltzmann distribution, 
the responsibility can be shifted between China and the U.S. by changing the β value, as 
shown in Fig. 1. Below a β value of 0.1164, China receives more permits than the U.S., 
thus leaving more responsibility to the U.S. Above that β value, the U.S. receives more 
permits than China, thus leaving more responsibility to China. This result shows the 
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flexibility of allocating permits using the Boltzmann distribution and the importance of 
determining a proper β value. 
 
Fig. 1. Permit allocation among eight countries using the Boltzmann distribution as a function of 
the β value. The emissions permits allocated to the U.S. are smallest when the β value is 0. The 
amount rapidly increases up to the β value of ~0.3, and beyond ~0.3 it increases rather slowly and 
approaches the total amount of available emissions permits. The amount of emissions permits 
allocated to China is the largest when the β value is 0. The amount rapidly decreases up to the β 
value of ~0.3 and approaches 0. The amount of emissions permits allocated to Italy is the largest 
when the β value is 0, and the amount monotonously decreases up to the β value of ~0.3. For all 
other countries (Canada, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the U.K.), the amount first increases and 
then gradually decreases to 0 in the given β-value range. The gray dotted line for China, the U.S., 
Canada, and Italy shows the β value at which the allocated permits meets their actual CO2 
emissions in 2008. 
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Fig. 2 shows the least square (y) calculation (Eq. (8)) between allocated permits and 
demand (actual CO2 emissions in 2008) as a function of the β value. In this empirical data 
analysis, the least square value (y) has its minimum at a β value of 0.0966. The results of 
emissions permit allocation with the reference β value are summarized in Table 3. The 
probability values for permit allocation are distributed between 0.02 and 0.41 for the 
eight countries, and the number of emissions permits allocated to the countries ranges 
from 392,870 to 7,079,729 (in 1000 metric tons). 
 
Fig. 2. Least square (y) calculation between allocated permits and demand (actual CO2 emissions 
in 2008) as a function of the β value. The least square value (y) has its minimum at the β value of 
0.0966, at which the difference between the allocated permits and demand becomes the smallest 
for the eight participating countries. This β value provides a reference point for the permit 
allocation. 
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Fig. 3 shows permit allocation using the Boltzmann distribution with the reference β 
value (β = 0.0966), and the allocated permits are compared with their actual CO2 
emissions in 2008. As listed in Table 3 and shown in Fig. 3, the permits allocated to two 
countries (China and the U.S.) exceed their demands. For the remaining six countries 
(Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the U.K.), the situation is the reverse. 
Therefore, after this initial permit allocation, emissions trading can occur between permit 
sellers (China and the U.S.) and permit buyers (Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
and the U.K.). It is also possible that extra emissions permits can be considered and 
supplied through the developing of technology, the planting of trees, and the reducing of 
CO2 emissions by carbon tax during emissions trading [14, 41-44]. Note that this 
empirical data analysis shows permit allocation among eight countries. If more countries 
are added, then permit sellers and permit buyers can be changed. 
 
 
 17
 Fig. 3. Permit allocation using the Boltzmann distribution with the least square reference β value 
(β = 0.0966). It shows the CO2 emissions in 2008 of the participating countries and the emissions 
permits allocated by the Boltzmann distribution. After the permit allocation, emissions permits 
can be traded between countries. 
 
 
Table 3 
The emissions permits of eight countries using the Boltzmann distribution (β = 
0.0966). 
Country CO2 emissions in 2008 (1000 metric tons) 
Boltzmann 
probability 
Allocated permits 
(1000 metric tons) Difference* 
Canada 544,091 0.03 516,460 -27,631
China 7,031,916 0.41 7,079,729 47,813
Germany 786,660 0.04 663,034 -123,626
Italy 445,119 0.02 392,870 -52,249
Japan 1,208,163 0.06 1,019,327 -188,836
Russia 1,708,653 0.09 1,453,215 -255,438
U.K. 522,856 0.03 447,322 -75,534
U.S. 5,461,014 0.32 5,512,179 51,165
Total 17,708,472 1.00 17,084,135 -624,337
 
* Difference = (allocated permits – actual carbon dioxide emissions in 2008). 
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6. Discussions and Conclusions 
The Boltzmann distribution, originating in the physical sciences, is based on entropy 
maximization and thus provides the most probable distribution of a physical system at 
equilibrium. Banerjee and Yakovenko (2010) observed that social and economic 
inequality is ubiquitous in the real world, and showed that the common theme of three 
specific cases (e.g., the distribution of money, income, and global energy consumption) is 
entropy maximization for the partitioning of a limited resource among multiple agents 
[45]. 
 
In this paper, we applied entropy maximization to the problem of permit allocation in 
emissions trading. When brought to initial permit allocation, the Boltzmann distribution 
provides the most probable allocation among multiple countries. The concept of most 
probable in the physical sciences may be translated into fair in permit allocation, as the 
distribution provides a natural and undistorted allocation among participating countries. 
We showed that the Boltzmann distribution includes one of the fairness notions, 
Egalitarian, when the β value approaches 0. 
 
Throughout this paper, we developed a mathematical description of permit allocation 
using the Boltzmann distribution. Then, through an empirical data analysis, we 
demonstrated how initial permit allocation can be performed over eight countries using 
the Boltzmann distribution. If emissions permits are allocated to the participating 
countries free of charge, the Boltzmann allocation is more like the grandfathering method, 
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in which emissions permits are distributed freely based on the historical output of each 
country. If emissions permits are allocated to the countries at their expense (for example, 
proportional to the amount of allocated permits), then the Boltzmann allocation is similar 
to auctioning. However, in the Boltzmann allocation, the cartel of bidders and speculative 
behaviors observed in auctioning become more limited. Further studies are needed to 
develop a proper price model for the Boltzmann allocation. In addition, more work is 
needed to find a sophisticated definition of the allocation potential energy per capita that 
reflects a variety of political and economical parameters. 
 
Note that the permit allocation using the Boltzmann distribution described here is a 
simple yet versatile, flexible method. In other words, it can be modified and adjusted for 
a variety of different purposes in addition to permit allocation. Two fundamental facts, 
limited resources and unlimited human wants, provide a foundation for the field of 
economics [46]. Where resources are limited or scarce and all human wants are virtually 
unlimited or insatiable, the Boltzmann distribution might be applicable. Such situations 
include various economic and environmental problems, such as the tradable permits 
approach to protect the commons (e.g., allowances of water and air pollution control, 
rights in water supply management, and quotas in fisheries management). In addition, the 
Boltzmann distribution might be applicable to fair division, also known as the cake-
cutting problem. 
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There are numerous methods for obtaining a fair division, or dividing a resource in such a 
way that all recipients believe they have received a fair amount (e.g., proportional fair 
division, envy-free division, exact division, Pareto optimal division, and equitable 
division) [47-53]. In the simplest two-player case, the well-known procedure of “the 
divide and choose method” leads to a proportional and envy-free division [54, 55]. 
However, this case may not consider other essential factors such as the weight or the 
daily required caloric intake of players. Furthermore, fair division with three or more 
players is considerably more complex than the two-player case [47, 48, 51, 56-58]. For 
example, let’s assume a cake is to be divided and distributed among three players: two 
adults, one of whom weighs 100 kgs and the other 55 kgs, and a child who weighs 20 kgs. 
If this cake is cut into three identical pieces, is it a fair division for the players? 
 
The division of a single homogeneous good (for example, a cake) among multiple players 
is easily accomplished using the Boltzmann distribution as described in this paper. In this 
case, an individual player’s weight or other essential factors (for example, daily required 
caloric intake) can be considered his or her allocation potential energy. For example, the 
allocation potential energy can be defined as the daily required caloric intake per unit 
weight. The cake can then be distributed to the players, taking into consideration their 
total weight and following the Boltzmann distribution probability. 
 
In summary, the Boltzmann distribution can be applied not only to permit allocation in 
emissions trading but also to other economic (e.g., fair division) and environmental (e.g., 
 21
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air and water pollution control, water and food supply management, and fisheries 
management) problems by replacing the allocation potential energy with the proper 
economic concepts. In this sense, the Boltzmann distribution based on entropy 
maximization may become a useful method for a variety of economic and environmental 
applications. 
 
Acknowledgments 
We thank Timothy Mount and Kieran P. Donaghy (Cornell University) for thoughtful 
comments. 
 
 
References 
[1] J. Hansen, M. Sato, R. Ruedy, K. Lo, D.W. Lea, M. Medina-Elizade, Global 
temperature change, P Natl Acad Sci USA, 103 (2006) 14288-14293. 
[2] S. Solomon, G.K. Plattner, R. Knutti, P. Friedlingstein, Irreversible climate change 
due to carbon dioxide emissions, P Natl Acad Sci USA, 106 (2009) 1704-1709. 
[3] N.H. Stern, Great Britain. Treasury., The economics of climate change: the Stern 
review, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2007. 
[4] B.G. Levi, Will desperate climates call for desperate geoengineering measures?, Phys 
Today, 61 (2008) 26-28. 
[5] U. Springer, The market for tradable GHG permits under the Kyoto Protocol: A 
survey of model studies, Energy Economics, 25 (2003) 527–551. 
[6] R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J Law Econ, 3 (1960) 1-44. 
[7] A.C. Pigou, The economics of welfare, Macmillan and co., ltd., London, 1920. 
[8] T.D. Crocker, The structuring of atmospheric pollution control systems, in: H. 
Wolozin (Ed.) The economics of air pollution, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1966, pp. 
61–86. 
[9] J.H. Dales, Pollution, property and prices, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1968. 
[10] W.J. Baumol, W.E. Oates, Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of 
Environment, Swed J Econ, 73 (1971) 42-51. 
[11] Montgome.Wd, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, J 
Econ Theory, 5 (1972) 395-418. 
[12] S.R. Milliman, R. Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological-Change in 
Pollution-Control, J Environ Econ Manag, 17 (1989) 247-265. 
[13] T.H. Tietenberg, Emissions trading : principles and practice, 2nd ed., Resources for 
the Future, Washington, DC, 2006. 
[14] D.G. Victor, The collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the struggle to slow global 
warming, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001. 
[15] G. Chichilnisky, G. Heal, D. Starrett, International emission permits: Equity and 
efficiency, in, Columbia University, New York, 1993. 
[16] P. Cramton, S. Kerr, Tradable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not 
grandfather, Energy Policy, 30 (2002) 333–345 
[17] Y.-B. Lai, The optimal distribution of pollution rights in the presence of political 
distortions, Environmental and Resource Economics, 26 (2007) 367–388. 
[18] S. Sorrel, J. Skea, Pollution for sale: Emissions trading and joint implementation, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 1999. 
[19] F. Reif, Fundamentals of statistical and thermal physics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 
1965. 
[20] G.H. Wannier, Statistical physics, Dover Publications, New York, 1987. 
[21] I. Tinoco, K. Sauer, J.C. Wang, J.D. Puglisi, Physical chemistry principles and 
applications in biological sciences, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 2002. 
[22] P. Burley, J. Foster, Economics and thermodynamics: New perspectives on 
economic analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA, 1994. 
 23
[23] H.T. Davis, The theory of econometrics, The Principia press, Bloomington, Ind., 
1941. 
[24] A. Dragulescu, V.M. Yakovenko, Statistical mechanics of money, Eur Phys J B, 17 
(2000) 723-729. 
[25] J.C. Ferrero, The statistical distribution of money and the rate of money transference, 
Physica A, 341 (2004) 575-585. 
[26] N. Georgescu-Roegen, The entropy law and the economic process, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. 
[27] S. Invernizzi, A. Medio, On Lags and Chaos in Economic Dynamic-Models, J Math 
Econ, 20 (1991) 521-550. 
[28] J.H.C. Lisman, Econometrics and Thermodynamics: A Remark on Davis' Theory of 
Budgets, Econometrica, 17 (1949) 59-62. 
[29] V. Pareto, Cours d'économie politique professé à l'Univers*ité de Lausanne, F. 
Rouge; Pichon; etc., Lausanne, Paris, 1896. 
[30] M. Shubik, The theory of money and financial institutions, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1999. 
[31] H. Theil, Economics and information theory, North-Holland Pub. Co.; Rand 
McNally, Amsterdam, Chicago, 1967. 
[32] H. Theil, D. Fiebig, A Maximum-Entropy Approach to the Specification of 
Distributed Lags, Econ Lett, 7 (1981) 339-342. 
[33] V.M. Yakovenko, J.B. Rosser, Colloquium: Statistical mechanics of money, wealth, 
and income, Rev Mod Phys, 81 (2009) 1703-1725. 
[34] A.G. Wilson, Entropy in urban and regional modelling, Pion, London, 1970. 
[35] D.G. Champernowne, A model of income distribution, The Economic Journal, 63 
(1953) 318–351. 
[36] R. Gibrat, Les inégalités economiques. Sirely, Paris, Sirely, Paris, 1931. 
[37] M. Kalecki, On the Gibrat Distribution, Econometrica, 13 (1945) 161-170. 
[38] R.N. Mantegna, H.E. Stanley, Scaling Behavior in the Dynamics of an Economic 
Index, Nature, 376 (1995) 46-49. 
[39] A. Rose, B. Stevens, J. Edmonds, M. Wise, International equity and differentiation 
in global warming policy - An application to tradeable emission permits, Environ Resour 
Econ, 12 (1998) 25-51. 
[40] L. Ringius, A. Torvanger, A. Underdal, Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in 
International Climate Policy, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, 2 (2002) 1-22. 
[41] J.E. Aldy, S. Barrett, R.N. Stavins, Thirteen plus one: a comparison of global climate 
policy architectures, Clim Policy, 3 (2003) 373-397. 
[42] R.N. Cooper, Toward a real global warming treaty, Foreign Aff, 77 (1998) 66-79. 
[43] W.D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global 
Warming, Rev Env Econ Policy, 1 (2007) 26-44. 
[44] W.A. Pizer, Prices vs. quantities revisited: The case of climate changeWashington, 
DC, in:  Discussion Paper 98-02, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, 1998. 
[45] A. Banerjee, V.M. Yakovenko, Universal patterns of inequality, New J Phys, 12 
(2010). 
 24
 25
[46] C.R. McConnell Economics, McGraw-Hill Inc., New York, 1984. 
[47] J.B. Barbanel, S.J. Brams, Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures 
for three persons, four persons, and beyond, Math Soc Sci, 48 (2004) 251-269. 
[48] S.J. Brams, A.D. Taylor, Fair division : from cake-cutting to dispute resolution, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge England ; New York, NY, USA, 1996. 
[49] S.J. Brams, A.D. Taylor, The win-win solution: Guaranteeing fair shares to 
everybody, W.W. Norton, New York 1999. 
[50] H. Moulin, Fair division and collective welfare, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2003. 
[51] J. Robertson, W. Webb, Cake-cutting algorithms : be fair if you can, A.K. Peters, 
Natick, Mass., 1998. 
[52] H.P. Young, Equity in theory and practice, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
1994. 
[53] J.B. Barbanel, The geometry of efficient fair division, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005. 
[54] S.J. Brams, M.A. Jones, C. Klamler, Perfect cake-cutting procedures with money, 
Preprint, Department of Politics, New York University, 2004. 
[55] M.A. Jones, Equitable, envy-free, and efficient cake cutting for two people and its 
application to divisible goods, Mathematics Magazine, 75 (2002) 275–283. 
[56] S.J. Brams, A.D. Taylor, W.S. Zwicker, A moving-knife solution to the four-person 
envy-free cake-division problem, P Am Math Soc, 125 (1997) 547-554. 
[57] E. Peterson, F.E. Su, Four-person envy-free chore division, Mathematics Magazine, 
75 (2000) 117–122. 
[58] W. Stromquist, How to Cut a Cake Fairly, Am Math Mon, 87 (1980) 640-644. 
 
 
 
 
